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DEFINING A FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH: A CRITIQUE
OF THE SUPREME COURT'S POST-KATZ JURISPRUDENCE
The fourth amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." ' 1 Because government actions 2 that are neither searches nor seizures are not' 3governed by the amendment, and therefore need not be
"reasonable," the definitions of search and seizure limit the scope of the
amendment's protection of individual rights. 4 For this reason, the Supreme
Court has defined search and seizure not by their ordinary meanings, but as
5
terms of art that reflect the interests protected by the fourth amendment.
Unlike the definition of seizure, 6 the definition of search has not been
satisfactorily articulated by the Court. 7 In Katz v. United States, the Warren
Court adopted an expansive definition of search, 8 but the application of this
definition has been sharply narrowed by the Burger Court. 9 The expansion
and contraction of the scope of the fourth amendment reflects the changing
ideological composition of the Court, but the translation of the Court's
ideology into fourth amendment doctrine has been facilitated by the
1. The full text of the fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The fourth amendment applies to the states through incorporation in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-34 (1963).
2. The fourth amendment does not govern searches and seizures by private individuals who do not
act on behalf of the government. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
3. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 356 (1974). Other constitutional guarantees, such as the due
process and equal protection clauses, are inadequate substitutes for rights protected by the fourth
amendment. See id. at 377-78.
4. See United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3302 (1984); United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct.
1652, 1662 (1984); Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 385.
5. For example, if government agents went onto privately owned land to look for marijuana plants,
most people would describe this action as a search. The Supreme Court, however, has held that such an
action is not a search because individuals do not have a privacy interest in "open fields" that is protected
by the fourth amendment. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741 (1984).
6. Generally, the act of physically taking and removing tangible items constitutes a seizure of those
items. 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1, at 221 (1978). In addition, eavesdropping on a
conversation may constitute a seizure of that conversation. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
A seizure of a person occurs when an "officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
7. 1NV.LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 2.1, at 221-24. This Comment will be concerned only with the
definition of a search.
8. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
9. Wasserstrom, The Incredible ShrinkingFourthAmendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257, 266-72
(1984).
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Court's reliance on definitions of search that have lacked any substantial
content. The goal of this Comment is to put forth a principled definition of
search that, while reflective of fourth amendment interests, is less vulnerable to the Court's ideological oscillations.
For much of the twentieth century prior to 1967, the Court defined search
by reference to the literal language of the fourth amendment. A search was
a physical trespass to a "constitutionally protected area," i.e., a physical
trespass to those "areas" explicitly protected by the fourth amendment:
persons, houses, papers, and effects. 10 As such, this definition principally
served to protect property interests from government interference. "
Yet the fourth amendment was meant to protect privacy interests as well
as property interests. 1 2 In large measure, of course, the protection of
10. Amsterdam, supra note 3,at 356-57; 1W. LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 2.1,
at 223-24.
11. Privacy, as such, was not protected under the "constitutionally protected area" doctrine.
Compare Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), with Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964)
(per curiam), rev'g 130 S.E.2d 437 (Va. 1963), and Silverman v. United States. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). In
Goldman, police officers placed an electronic amplifying device against the outside of a party wall in
order to listen to conversations in an adjacent office. Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131-32. The Court held that
the use of the device was not a search because no trespass was committed in using the device. Id. at
134-35. In Silverman and Clinton. the Court held that the use of similar devices to eavesdrop on
conversations was a search because the devices had physically penetrated the premises where the
overheard conversations occurred. In Clinton, a microphone was held against a party wall using a
thumbtack. Clinton, 130 S.E.2d at 442. In Silverman, a "spike mike" was attached to a heating duct.
transforming the duct into "a giant microphone, running through the entire house occupied by
appellants." Silverman, 365 U.S. at 509 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 275 F.2d 173, 179 (D.C.
Cir. 1960)). Although the finding of a search despite the triviality of the trespasses in Silverman and
Clinton no doubt reflected the Court's dissatisfaction with the "constitutionally protected area"
doctrine, all three of these decisions had little to do with privacy per se, but were concerned with the
protection of property from trespass. Only through the protection of property interests were privacy
interests protected.
12. Before the development of the Court's "constitutionally protected area" analysis, the Court
had stated in an often-quoted passage, "It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property .... - Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616.
630 (1886). Note also Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting):
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right,
every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the
means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, note Justice Brennan's dissent in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 459 (1963) (Brennan.
J.,dissenting):
Olmstead's illiberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as limited to the tangible fruits of
actual trespasses was a departure from the Court's previous decisions, notably Boyd, and a
misreading of the history and purpose of the Amendment. Such a limitation cannot be squared
with a meaningful right to inviolate personal liberty.

Defining a Fourth Amendment Search
property interests, such as houses, served to protect privacy interests, at
least to the extent of preventing arbitrary physical trespasses. But technological developments, particularly in communications and surveillance
techniques, left a definition of search based on the protection of property
interests increasingly incapable of protecting privacy interests. 13 For example, telephone conversations, because they pass over "wires. . .not part
of [a person's] house or office, any more than . . . the highways along
which they are stretched," were not protected by the amendment. 14 Moreover, the requirement of a physical trespass permitted the government,
through the use of electronic eavesdropping equipment, to interfere with
personal privacy even within explicitly protected areas such as houses. 15
As the Warren Court came to identify fourth amendment interests more
closely with privacy than with property, 16 the Court's definition of a search
as a physical trespass to a "constitutionally protected area" became insupportable. In 1967, in Katz v. United States, 17 the Court abandoned the
"constitutionally protected area" definition in favor of a definition based
squarely on the protection of privacy. In Katz, the Court held that electronic
eavesdropping on a telephone booth by government agents was a search
because the agents' conduct "violated the privacy upon which [the caller]
8
justifiably relied.'
Katz was widely believed to be a watershed in the definition of a fourth
amendment search. 19Nowhere in Katz, however, did the Court identify the
privacy upon which individuals could justifiably rely. The task of developing a fourth amendment jurisprudence based upon privacy devolved upon
13. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,465-71 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Olmstead
v.-United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
15. Such devices as the "detectaphone," see Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 131-32
(1942), and concealed voice transmitters, see On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747,749 (1952), could
not have been anticipated by the framers of the fourth amendment.
By the 1950's, the use of sophisticated sensing and surveillance devices by law enforcement agencies
had become pervasive. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,466-69 & nn. 14-17 (Brennan,
J.,
dissenting) (discussing S.DASH, R. ScHwARiTz, & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959)).
16. The Warren Court did so in two respects. First, the Court held that conversations overheard
through a violation of the fourth amendment could be excluded from trial. Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471,485 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,511 (1961). Previously, the Court
had only excluded tangible property. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 466 (1928).
Second, the Court held that a fourth amendment violation was not contingent on a trespass under local
property law. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511. Cf.Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,304 (1967) (right of the
government to search and seize not controlled by a superior property interest).
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18. Id. at 353.
19. See Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 382. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979)
(Katz is the "lodestar" for determining whether government action is a search); Note, From Private
Places to PersonalPrivacy:A Post-Katz Study of FourthAmendment Protections,43 N.Y.U. L. REv.
968, 968 (1968) ("landmark" case).
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the Burger Court, but that Court's application of Katz has reaffirmed the
20
results, if not the rationale, of many of the Court's pre-Katz decisions. It
should not be surprising, then, that many of the inadequacies of the Court's
pre-Katz jurisprudence, such as the arbitrary protection of privacy rights
and the vulnerability of those rights to technological developments, have
reappeared in the Court's post-Katz jurisprudence. Moreover, while the
pre-Katz definition of a search at least provided "a workable tool for the
reasoning of the courts," 21 the post-Katz definition of the Burger Court is
nearly devoid of content.
This Comment attributes the inadequacies of the Burger Court's application of Katz to that Court's identification of an interest in privacy with an
interest in the secrecy of information. An interest in privacy, however,
should more properly be defined as an interest in being left alone. 22
Accordingly, this Comment proposes that a search be defined by reference
to the conduct of the government, rather than by reference to the information uncovered by that conduct. Specifically, a search should be defined as
conduct that violates a social norm of privacy. Such a definition of search
would have several beneficial consequences. Among these are a definition
of search more consonant with social privacy values, less subject to judicial
manipulation, and less vulnerable to technological change.
I.

PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BURGER COURT'S
DEFINITION OF A SEARCH

The Burger Court, drawing upon Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz, 23
has defined a fourth amendment search by reference to expectations of
privacy in information. 24 A government action is a search if the person
challenging the constitutionality of the action has a "reasonable" 25 or
20. Of the pre-Katz cases in which the Court held that no search occurred, only Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), have been expressly
overruled, and those by Katz itself. Several other cases thought by courts and commentators to have
been implicitly overruled by Katz have been expressly reaffirmed in cases subsequent to Katz. E.g.,
Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1740 (1984) (reaff'g Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924)("open fields" doctrine)); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,749-50 (1971) (reaff'g Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (electronic eavesdropping on conversations with government
agents) and On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (electronic eavesdropping on conversations
with government agents)).
The evisceration of Katz has not been accidental. The Court has almost uniformly granted review in
those cases in which a lower court had upheld a defendant's fourth amendment claim. Wasserstrom,
supra note 9, at 260.
21. Note, supra note 19, at 968.
22. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
24. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1971) (plurality opinion).
25. Id. A "reasonable expectation of privacy" should not be confused with a reasonable search.

Defining a Fourth Amendment Search
"legitimate" expectation of privacy in the information that the action
26
uncovers.
Although the Court has often used the terms "reasonable" and "legitimate" interchangeably, 27 these terms reflect distinctly different expectations of privacy. A reasonable expectation of privacy in information is a
reasonable expectation that information will not be discovered, given the
information's context. 28 A legitimate expectation of privacy in information
is a legitimate expectation that information will not be discovered, regardless of the reasonableness of such an expectation under the circumstances. 29 For example, the Court has held that an expectation of privacy in
the possession of contraband is illegitimate. 30 Even if a person possesses
contraband under circumstances that would ordinarily support a reasonable
The violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy defines a search. If a reasonable expectation of
privacy is violated, a court must then determine whether the violation itself was reasonable. Only if a
reasonable expectation of privacy is unreasonably violated does the government transgress the fourth
amendment.
26. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
27. See, e.g., id. at 740. The phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" appeared in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). The phrase was taken from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz.
Katz, 389 U.S at 360 (Harlan, L, concurring). The adjective "legitimate" appeared in United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977). In recent years, the Court has interchangeably used several different
formulations of "expectation ofprivacy." See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1661-62
& n.22 (1984) ("an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable"; "an interest
in privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable"; "a 'legitimate' expectation of privacy";
"a legitimate interest in privacy").
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz, 389 U.S. at 360, would have required a subjective expectation
of privacy in addition to a reasonable expectation ofprivacy. What Justice Harlan was apparently trying
to capture with the subjective expectations test was the notion that information that a person intentionally exposes to the plain view of others is not protected by the fourth amendment. See Katz, 389
U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). But the essence of this notion is the intentional exposure, not the
subjective expectation of privacy. At best, an analysis of the scope of the fourth amendment based upon
subjective expectations is unhelpful. At worst, such an analysis is dangerously misleading. The analysis
of subjective expectations is unhelpful because subjective expectations of privacy are almost invariably
reflections of objective conditions. Even though the Court has adopted the subjective aspect of Harlan's
test, see, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979), the Court has never failed to find a
subjective expectation of privacy where it found that an expectation would be objectively reasonable.
The analysis of subjective expectations is misleading because it would permit the government to
define the scope of the fourth amendment by manipulating subjective expectations of privacy. As
Professor Amsterdam wrote in 1974, if subjective expectations were determinative of fourth amendment rights, "the government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by
announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was being advanced by a decade and that we were all
forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance." Amsterdam, supra note 3, at
384. The Supreme Court has recognized this flaw and has stated that in such extreme circumstances it
would engage in a "normative" analysis of the scope of the amendment. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5.
Justice Harlan himself abandoned the subjective expectations test four years after his opinion in Katz.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
28. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. See United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1661-62 (1984).
30. Id.; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
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expectation of privacy, e.g., if the contraband is in a suitcase, 31 the Court
will not protect such an expectation of privacy since the expectation,
though reasonable, is not legitimate.32 In order for a government action to
be a search under the fourth amendment, that action must violate an
expectation of privacy that is both reasonable and legitimate.
Both the Court's reasonable expectation of privacy and legitimate expectation of privacy tests inadequately protect fourth amendment privacy
interests. A fundamental inadequacy shared by both tests is their focus on
the information uncovered by the government, rather than on the means
used by the government to uncover that information.
A.

Reasonable Expectations of Privacy

A definition of search based upon the reasonableness of an expectation
that information will remain private is inevitably arbitrary. First, almost all
information is subject to discovery. Some expectations that information
will not be discovered are more reasonable than others, but there is no
obvious point at which a distinction can be made between reasonable and
unreasonable expectations. Second, and more importantly, individuals do
not undertake activities that they wish to remain confidential without in
some sense reasonably expecting that those activities will not come to
light. As such, a reasonableness standard is too broad: if the fourth
amendment protected all activities that persons reasonably expected would
not be discovered, the government would have to justify under the amendment almost every investigative activity in which it engaged. 33
Therefore, in order to give content to the phrase "reasonable expectation
of privacy," the Court has been forced to decide which expectations of
privacy it is willing to recognize as reasonable. In making this decision, the
Court has developed a set of largely arbitrary criteria that are strongly
reminiscent of the discredited, pre-Katz "constitutionally protected area"
definition, albeit without the requirement of a physical trespass. 34
31. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
32. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983). In Place, a dog was used to sniff a
suitcase for illegal narcotics. Id. at 699. Since the dog could determine only whether the suitcase
contained contraband, and no other fact, use of the dog was not a search. Id. at 707. Although the Court
would not protect an expectation of privacy in contraband, a suitcase could contain other, legitimate
items. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. Therefore, opening a suitcase is a search, even if the
suitcase in fact contains only contraband. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
33. A classic example of this problem is burglary of a summer cabin in the off season. An
expectation that such an activity could be performed without discovery would be eminently reasonable.
Yet, if the police were by chance to come upon the burglar, no one would seriously suggest that the
police would be engaging in a search. The Supreme Court has stated in dicta that such an "expectation of
privacy is not one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " United States v. Jacobsen, 104
S. Ct. 1652, 1661 n.22 (1984).
34. In Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984), the Court stated that "Katz's 'reasonable

Defining a Fourth Amendment Search
Thus, the Court has held that a person ordinarily has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in information contained within areas such as homes
("houses") 35 and suitcases ("effects"), 36 but that a person does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in information contained within areas,
such as "open fields" 37 and public highways, 38 that the Court is unwilling
to characterize as "persons, houses, papers, or effects."
In addition to these arbitrary distinctions based upon particular areas, the
Court has indicated that a person can have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information that is obtained from an area in which a person does
not have a possessory interest. 39 Suppose, for example, that A keeps
incriminating evidence in the home of B. If the police forcibly enter B's
home and discover the incriminating evidence, the entry of the police is a
search as to B because it is B's home. The entry is not a search as to A
because A has no possessory interest in B's home, and therefore, according
to the Court, has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the incriminating
evidence found within B's home. The Court's rationale is that the absence
of a possessory interest in the area in which information is uncovered
precludes effective control over the information, and thereby precludes a
reasonable expectation that the information will remain undiscovered by, or
undisclosed to, third parties. 4°

expectation of privacy' standard did not sever Fourth Amendment doctrine from the Amendment's
language. . . . As Katz demonstrates, the Court fairly may respect the constraints of the Constitution's
language without wedding itself to an unreasoning literalism." Id. at 1740 n.6. In Oliver, the Court
concluded that because an "open field" was not an "effect" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, police could trespass onto "open fields" without violating the fourth amendment. Id. at
1740. (The Court thereby reaffirmed the pre-Katz case Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).)
The Court then reached the same conclusion under the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. Oliver,
104 S. Ct. at 1740-44. In effect, this limits "reasonable expectations of privacy" to those areas
protected under the pre-Katz "constitutionally protected area" definition.
35. E.g., United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3303 (1984).
36. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (footlocker).
37. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
38. E.g., United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276
(1983). In Karo, the Court held that monitoring an electronic tracking device while the device was in a
"public" place, such as a highway, was not a search, but monitoring the device while the device was in a
"private" place, such as a home, was a search. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3303-04. The government conduct
was precisely the same in each instance, but the Court noted that the location of an object in public was
apparent to anyone who wished to look, whereas the location of an object would be concealed from
public view within a private place such as a home. Id.
39. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). The possessory interest need not be a legal
property interest. See id. at 91-92.
40. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980). See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 143 n.12, 149 (1978). In Rakas, the Court subsumed the determination of fourth amendment
standing under the general rubric of the Court's "reasonable expectation of privacy" analysis: only a
person who has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information uncovered by the government has
been searched and has standing to assert fourth amendment rights. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139.
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These distinctions with respect to the reasonableness of privacy expectations have led the Court to find similar privacy interests in radically
disparate contexts, and significantly different privacy interests in contexts
that are nearly identical. For example, the Court has found no meaningful
difference between the privacy interest that a person has in a privately
owned field that is physically and legally secluded from public view and the
privacy interest that a person has on a busy public street. 4 1 A field was not
deemed to afford the privacy protection offered by a home, and could not be
characterized as a "person, house, paper, or effect.", 42 Yet the Court would
find a significant difference in privacy interests between having one's car
monitored by an electronic tracking device while the car is parked in a
driveway and having it monitored while it is parked in a garage. 43 The
Court's justification is that the car is exposed to public view while in the
driveway, but the car is not so exposed while in the garage. 44
These decisions bear little relationship to the privacy expectations of
individuals. Part of the problem is that the Court insists upon applying
broad generalizations about privacy to specific contexts. The Court could
perhaps have chosen better criteria and applied them less mechanically, but
any effort to specify protected and unprotected contexts will lead to
unsatisfactory results because individual expectations of privacy are not
expectations that specific contexts will be private, but expectations that
certain conduct will not occur within those contexts. As the Katz Court
noted, the fourth amendment protects people, not places. 45 Because of the
nature of these individual expectations of privacy, the issue is not whether a
person has a right to expect that information within a certain context will
not be disclosed, but whether that person has a right to be free from a
particular type of conduct within that context. 46
An expectation of privacy in information is a derivative of expectations
of conduct within a particular context. But by focusing only on the derivative expectation of privacy in information, the Court often fails to consider
fully the privacy expectations of individuals. In particular, the Court often
41. See Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1740-44 (1984).
42. Id.
43. CompareUnited States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296,3303-04 (1984), with United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276, 281-84 (1983).
44. See United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3303-04 (1984).
45. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
46. In Katz, the government argued that since the "bugged" telephone booth from which the
defendant made his calls was constructed partly of glass, the defendant was as visible after he entered
the booth as he would have been had he remained outside. Id. at 352. The Court responded that what the
defendant "sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye-it was the uninvited
ear. " Id. Thus, the booth was protected under the fourth amendment from eavesdropping, but not from
visual observation. Whether the booth, viewed in the abstract, was "constitutionally protected" was
irrelevant. See id. at 351.

Defining a Fourth Amendment Search
fails to consider an expectation of privacy against the very conduct of the
government in the case before it.
For example, suppose that A talks to B by telephone. Unknown to A, B is
a government informant. Also unknown to A, government agents are
electronically eavesdropping on the conversation. A may have the following
expectations of privacy: (1) that B is a confidant and (2) that no one is
eavesdropping on the conversation. Under the Court's fourth amendment
decisions, the first expectation is unreasonable, 47 but the second expectation is reasonable. 48 A, then, has both reasonable and unreasonable expectations of privacy in the telephone conversation, but under the Court's
definition of a search, A's expectation must be characterized as one or the
other.
The Court's solution to this difficulty is simply to deny recognition to
reasonable expectations of privacy if any expectation of privacy in the
information uncovered is unreasonable. 49 Thus, the Court often does not
even consider for protection under the fourth amendment a broad range of
individual privacy expectations. In the hypothetical above, A's expectation
of privacy in the conversation is unreasonable because A has no reasonable
expectation of privacy against the government informer. 50 That A has a
reasonable expectation of privacy against eavesdropping on the conversation is irrelevant. The conversation is therefore unprotected by the
fourth amendment, and the government can uncover the contents of the
conversation, without engaging in a search, by any means that the government wishes. 5 1 Moreover, even if the government informer refused to reveal
the contents of the conversation, the eavesdropping by the government
agents would still not constitute a search. The informer's participation in
the conversation would be sufficient to preclude a reasonable expectation of

47. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). The expectation is
unreasonable because the agent has obtained the information through the voluntary, albeit uninformed,
disclosure of the speaker. What the agent does with the information after obtaining it is not governed by
the fourth amendment.
48. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). In Knotts, the Court held that
monitoring a person's movements over public highways by means of a concealed electronic tracking
device was not a search. Id. at 285. The Court reasoned that anyone could follow a person in public,

therefore, the person followed could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her public
movements. Id. at 281. Thus, the Court did not even consider whether a person might have a separate
expectation of privacy against the use of an electronic tracking device, the actual means used to follow
the defendant in the case before it. That the person could have no reasonable expectation of privacy
against being visually followed was dispositive. Id. at 282-84.
50. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (plurality opinion).

51.

See id. at 751-53.
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privacy in the conversation because the informer could have revealed the
52
contents of the conversation.
In order to protect information that is meant to be private, individuals
must protect that information from exposure to all conduct against which
they would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is an
important consequence of the Court's failure to protect the full extent of an
individual's privacy expectations within a given context. In the hypothetical above, A would have to make certain that B was not a government
informant in order to protect himself or herself from eavesdropping by the
government. Similarly, in order to be protected from electronic tracking
devices, individuals can never leave home. The Court has held that outside
homes and other private places, individuals have no reasonable expectation
that they will not be visually observed, and therefore, individuals can have
no reasonable expectation of privacy in their public movements. 53 That
individuals may have a reasonable expectation that electronic tracking
54
devices will not be attached to their persons and possessions is irrelevant.
It follows that the government's use of any device that can discover the
location and movement of individuals in public is not a fourth amendment
search.
In order to exist in society, individuals must "expose" information to
discovery by the government and the general public. A measure of privacy
can be maintained, without the necessity of living as a hermit, only so long
as individuals can risk exposing information to certain types of conduct
without risking exposing that information to all types of conduct. The
Court, however, has too readily equated the potential exposure of information with the absence of any privacy interest in that information. In
addition, this tendency on the part of the Court has left individual privacy
vulnerable to advances in surveillance and communications technology. 55
So long as any exposure of information makes that information fair game
for government surveillance, advances in surveillance technology will
enable the government to reach further into the private lives of individuals
without the restraints of the fourth amendment. Eventually, individuals
52. See id. at 753-54.
The Court could have attempted to resolve the problem of contradictory expectations ofprivacy in the
same information by aggregating the expectations of privacy in order to determine whether the
"overall" expectation of privacy in the information was reasonable or unreasonable. Yet, even if
possible, such an aggregation would inevitably compromise the protection of a reasonable expectation
of privacy, particularly if the means used to uncover the information was precisely the conduct against
which a reasonable expectation of privacy was held.
53. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-85 (1983).
54. See id.
55.

See, e.g., Landever, Electronic Surveillance, Computers, and the Fourth Amendment-The

New TelecommunicationsEnvironment Calls for Reexamination of Doctrine, 15 TOLEDO L. REv. 597
(1984).
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may have no privacy at all outside the limited confines of their homes, and
very little inside. Justice Rehnquist has argued that the abuse of such
developments is not likely, and certainly not imminent. 56 But even if such
an optimistic view of government were justified, 57 under the Court's
current definition of a search, as under the pre-Katz "constitutionally
protected area" definition, constitutional protection against the abuse of
technology in the area of personal privacy has been foreclosed.
B.

Legitimate Expectations of Privacy

Even if an individual's expectations meet the stringent criteria of the
reasonableness standard, the Court's emphasis on the information obtained
by the government may still lead to the conclusion that no search has
occurred.
1.

Contraband

In United States v. Jacobsen,58 a government agent chemically tested
powder that he suspected was cocaine. 59 The test could disclose only
whether the powder was cocaine. 60 The Court held that because Congress
had decided to treat the interest in privately possessing cocaine as "illegitimate" by making such possession illegal, 61 a test that could disclose only
whether the substance tested was cocaine, and no other fact, could infringe
no legitimate expectation of privacy. 62 Therefore, the use of the test was not
a fourth amendment search.63
An expectation of privacy in information, then, must not only be reasonable, it must also be legitimate. That is, not only must a person reasonably
expect that information will not be discovered, the information that the
person wishes to protect from discovery must also be "legitimate" information. Information that is illegitimate, e.g., possession of contraband,64 is
56. Justice Rehnquist has stated that if the use of electronic tracking devices were to be abused by
law enforcement agencies in the future, "there [would] be time enough then to determine whether
different constitutional principles may be applicable." United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284
(1983). He did not suggest what those principles might be.
57. Note the abuse of electronic eavesdropping devices by government agencies prior to Katz, as
presented in S. DASH, R. ScHwARTz, & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS passim (1959).
58. 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
59. Id. at 1655.
60. Id. at 1655 n.1.
61. Id. at 1662.
62. Id.
63. Id. See also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
64. United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1662 (1984). See also United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 707 (1983).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 61:191, 1986

not protected under the fourth amendment, even if a person reasonably
expects that such information will not be discovered. 65
The Jacobsen Court's holding that expectations of privacy in certain
types of information are illegitimate is contrary to the Court's holding in
Katz that any privacy upon which a person could justifiably rely is protected under the fourth amendment. 66 Under Katz, a court is required to
assess the justifiability of a claim of privacy. Under the Court's legitimate
expectation of privacy test, the legitimacy or justifiability of a claim of
privacy is not at issue. Rather, at issue is the legitimacy of the information
protected by a claim of privacy. Only if the information sought to be
protected by a claim of privacy is legitimate does the Court assess the
67
justifiability of the claim of privacy.
The Court's legitimate expectation of privacy test is based on the notion
that the fourth amendment is meant to protect only the "innocent." 68 Under
this notion, the "guilty" are protected by the amendment only to the extent
necessary to protect the innocent. 69 Because discrete sensing devices such
as chemical tests and trained dogs are capable of disclosing only whether a
person is guilty of possessing contraband, the fourth amendment does not
70
govern the use of these devices.
The argument that the fourth amendment protects only the innocent is
flawed in several respects. First, it is impossible to protect the privacy of the
65. In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), for example, the Court acknowledged that a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of luggage. Id. at 707. If those contents
are contraband, however, the expectation is not legitimate and not protected by the fourth amendment.
See id.
Nevertheless, some government actions that uncover contraband will be searches. If a government
agent physically opens a suitcase without the owner's permission, that act is a search, even if the
suitcase contains only contraband. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977). The act is a
search because the suitcase could contain items, other than contraband, in which a person could have a
legitimate expectation of privacy. On the other hand, if adrug-detecting dog sniffs a suitcase, the dog
can discover only whether the suitcase contains contraband. Therefore, a dog sniffdoes not constitute a
search.
66. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
67. See United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1662 & n.23 (1984); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
68. See United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1662 & n.23 (1984) (citing Loewy, The Fourth
Amendment as a Devicefor Protectingthe Innocent, 81 MIcH. L.REV. 1229 (1983)). Professor Loewy
has strongly advocated this approach to the scope of the fourth amendment. See also Loewy, Protecting
Citizens from Cops and Crooks: An Assessment of the Supreme Court'sInterpretationof the Fourth
Amendment Duringthe 1982 Term, 62 N.C.L. REv. 329 (1984).
69. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Devicefor Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1229, 1244-48 (1983).
70. Id. at 1245-48. To the extent that the manner in which such devices are used is offensive (e.g., a
body sniff by a drug-detecting German shepherd), or to the extent that such devices produce inaccurate
results, the "innocent" are not protected. Professor Loewy would not consider the use of such devices
under these circumstances to be immune from the fourth amendment. Id. at 1246-47. This Comment
assumes that these circumstances are not involved.
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innocent without protecting the privacy of the guilty. The use of discrete
sensing devices, even in the limited ways explicitly approved by the
Court, 71 affects the innocent to some extent. The innocent, as well as the
guilty, must have their innocence verified by the government. 72 In addition,
the devices disclose not only the presence of contraband, but its absence as
well. Information as to what an individual does not possess is no73less
information than information as to what an individual does possess.
Second, the Court's analysis makes the legislature the arbiter of the
scope of the fourth amendment. Because Congress had decreed that cocaine was contraband, the use of the chemical test in Jacobsenwas not a
search. 74 If Congress were to make the possession of cocaine legal, use of
the test presumably would then be a search. The Court should not make
Congress the arbiter of the scope of a constitutional provision protecting
individual rights.
Third, there is no support in either the language or the history of the
fourth amendment for the proposition that it protects only the innocent.
There is no distinction in the language of the amendment between the guilty
and the innocent; the amendment simply protects the right of "the people"
to be secure. 75 Much of the hostility to the colonial writs of assistance and
general warrants, which led to the adoption of the fourth amendment, was
inspired not by the execution of the writs and warrants themselves, but by
the use of the writs and warrants to enforce unpopular laws against
smuggling, sedition, and libel. 76 The fourth amendment should not be
viewed as merely an instrument for securing the peace and quiet for those
71. See United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696
(1983). Jacobsen involved chemical testing of a substance already in the government's possession. In
Place, agents had drug-detecting dogs sniff luggage outside the presence of the owner. The Court
concluded that "the particular course of investigation" used by the agents was not a fourth amendment
search. Id. at 707.
72. Cf. Gardner, Sniffingfor Drugs in the Classroom-Perspectiveson FourthAmendment Scope,
74 Nw. U.L. REv. 803, 844-47 (1980) (arguing that people have the right to be free from unwarranted
suspicion).
73. Professor Loewy argues that because the fourth amendment permits the government to search
for and seize evidence of crime, an individual has no inherent right to secrete such evidence. Loewy,
supra note 69, at 1244. Therefore, use of a device that can disclose only evidence of crime is not a
search. Id. at 1244-48. This conclusion does not follow from its premise. The fourth amendment
obviously permits the government to search for and seize evidence of crime. Moreover, the amendment
permits the government to search for and seize any type of evidence. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
300-01 (1967). But the amendment places restrictions on the manner in which the government may do
so. The issue is not whether the government can search for evidence of crime, but how it may do so.
74. United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1662 (1984).
75. U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
76. See R. RurAND, THE BnR OFTHE BILL OFRIGHTS, 1776-91, at 11, 25 (1983); N. LASSON, THE
HISTORY AND DEvELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-78

(1937); White, ForgottenPointsin the "ExclusionaryRule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1273, 1273 star
note (1983).
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who obey the laws; it should be viewed as a check on the power of the
government to enforce laws that particularly affect activities carried on in
private. 77 In a certain sense, the fourth amendment is very much intended to
78
protect the privacy of "illegitimate" information.
2.

InsignificantInformation

A related difficulty caused by the Court's identification of privacy
interests with the secrecy of information is the Court's unwillingness to
protect information that it deems to be insignificant. To date, the Court has
explicitly held only that an expectation of privacy in information concerning the possession of contraband is illegitimate. Nonetheless, several
decisions of the Court suggest that where an individual does not have a
sufficiently compelling interest in the privacy of the particular information
uncovered by the government, fourth amendment protection of that privacy
79
is unwarranted.
For example, in Smith v. Maryland,80 the Court held that the use of a pen
register 8' to record the local numbers dialed from a private phone was not a
search because Smith had "voluntarily" conveyed the numbers to the
telephone company's switching equipment. 82 But as the dissenting Justices
noted, the Court's reasoning made the case indistinguishable from Katz:83
just as Smith had to convey the numbers that he dialed to the telephone
company in order to complete his call, Katz had to convey his words to the
telephone company so that the words could be relayed to the person with
whom he was speaking. 84 The majority distinguished Katz on the ground
that a pen register was far less intrusive than bugging a telephone conversation because the pen register did not disclose the contents of the
77. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (fourth amendment, together with
other constitutional provisions, precludes state ban on use of contraceptives by married couples).
78. Cf Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (purely private possession of obscene matter
protected by first amendment, though obscene matter is unprotected by first amendment in other
contexts).
79. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741 (1984) ("There is no societal interest in
protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.");
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979) (pen register'distinguished from "bugging" of
telephone conversation on the ground that a pen register does not acquire the contents of conversations,
but only the telephone numbers dialed from a particular telephone).
80. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
81. A pen register is a device that records the numbers dialed from a particular telephone. The
device can be installed at the offices of the telephone company, thus avoiding the need for trespassing
into a home or office in order to install the device.
82. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-46 (1979).
83. Id. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
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telephone conversation. 85 Although the Court rested its decision on the
"voluntary" conveyance of the numbers dialed, 86 the import of the opinion
is that the use of pen registers is not a search because a privacy interest in
the numbers dialed from a telephone is not sufficiently compelling to
87
warrant fourth amendment protection.
A definition of a fourth amendment search based on the importance of
the information threatened with discovery by the government is objectionable for the same reason that a definition based on the protection of the
innocent is objectionable. The nature of the information uncovered by the
government has nothing to do with the privacy expectations of individuals.
An individual's right to privacy is no less legitimate because of the nature of
the information that the individual chooses to protect with his or her
privacy rights. A balancing of individual interests and governmental interests may be necessary when the Court has found that government action
constituted a search and must then determine whether that search was
reasonable under the fourth amendment. A balancing of interests is improper, however, when the Court must determine whether the action of the
government was a search at all. To hold that an action of the government
85. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
86. Id. at 743-44.
87. Another instance of the Court's refusal to protect "insignificant" privacy interests is United
States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984). As noted, supranote 38, Karo held that monitoring electronic
tracking devices while the devices were in public places was not a search, but that monitoring the
devices while they were in private places, such as homes and offices, was a search. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at
3303-04. The rationale of the Court's decision was that information regarding a person's or a thing's
location in public was available to anyone who cared to look. Id. at 3303. Yet, even granting that
following someone in public is not a search, see infranotes 127-28 and accompanying text, the Court's
contention that the use of electronic tracking devices is merely a more efficient means of following
someone, United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983), is untenable. Without the use of electronic
tracking devices, the police would not have been able to track the defendants in Karo. See Karo, 104 S.
Ct. at 3300-01. Moreover, an electronic tracking device permits the police to locate an object as well as
follow it. Id.
A better explanation for the result in Karois that the Court found the interest in the privacy of location
and movement to be uncompelling in public, but compelling in private. Justice White wrote for the
Court that "[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view would
present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth
Amendment oversight." Id. at 3304.
This explanation of Karo is buttressed by the Court's decision in Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct.
1735 (1984). The Court held in Oliver that "an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for
activities conducted out ofdoors in open fields," even on private property not visible to the public. Id. at
1741. Although the Court's decision was premised in part on the fact that even secluded fields were open
to the view of trespassers, id., the Court contrasted the fourth amendment's "overriding respect for the
sanctity of the home" (quoting from Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980)) with open fields,
which "do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter
from government interference or surveillance," Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741. The Court's refusal to protect
even the most inaccessible of private lands indicates that its decision was substantially based on the
nature of the information likely to be uncovered in "open fields."
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was not a search is to hold that the action did not interfere with any fourth
amendment privacy interest of the individual.
In addition to this fundamental difficulty with the Court's approach, a
definition of search based on the importance of the information that the
government threatens to uncover is simply impractical. First, the privacy of
information is not equally important to all individuals. Information that one
individual strongly desires to keep secret may be of no consequence to
another. There is no societal consensus upon which the Court can rely as to
what information is sufficiently significant for fourth amendment protec88
tion.
Second, the Court's evaluation of the information uncovered by a government action tends to trivialize an individual's privacy interest. Government actions may be identical but for the type of information that they
uncover. For instance, a dog may be trained to react to the presence of a
wide variety of substances, both contraband and legal. Yet, because a
particular dog may be able to uncover only a specific type of information,
the collective threat to privacy posed by trained dogs does not enter into the
Court's analysis of privacy interests. This "balkanization" of privacy
interests is all the more threatening because of the prospect of technological
advances in sensing devices that will permit the government to look for
specific information without the risk of uncovering other types of unwanted
information. Justice Brennan has expressed his fear that, given such advances, the Court's analysis of the legitimacy of information "may very
well have paved the way for technology to override the limits of law in the
area of criminal investigation." 89
Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the Burger Court's restrictive
definition of a search is that such a restrictive definition has been largely
unnecessary to reach the outcomes that the Court has wished to achieve. In
nearly all the search cases in which the Burger Court held that no search
occurred, and thus that there was no fourth amendment violation, the Court
could have reached the same result by holding that the government practice
was a search, but a reasonable search. 90 In this way, the Court would still
88. With societal notions about the importance of information, contrast the societal consensus
against the act of eavesdropping on telephone conversations and the consensus against the act of
trespassing on private land. Social rules against trespassing and eavesdropping have less to do with the
importance of privacy in these areas than with more general notions of proper social behavior.
Eavesdropping on a conversation and trespassing are no less "wrong" when the information that can be
obtained through these acts is of trivial importance.
89. United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1669 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 9, at 376-77 (police in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276 (1983), had reasonable suspicion of commission of a crime, and therefore Court could have held
that use of electronic tracking device was a search, but a reasonable search permitted by the fourth
amendment). But cf Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 394-95 (cautioning against too readily abandoning
rigid fourth amendment standards for determining the reasonableness of searches, e.g., the warrant
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have the power to control the government practice at issue if the practice
were to be abused in the future. Instead, the Court opted to divest itself of
control over the practices in question by ruling that they were not searches.
A better approach to the definition of a search is to focus on the conduct
of the government rather than on the information that the conduct uncovers.
Such an approach would comport more closely with individual expectations of privacy by protecting the full range of individual privacy expectations, not simply "reasonable" expectations of privacy in information that
is "legitimate." By focusing on the conduct of the government, privacy
expectations in all types of information would be protected, and individuals
could take the risk of exposing private information to one form of conduct,
government or private, without relinquishing their privacy as against all
forms of government conduct.
II.

SOCIAL NORMS OF PRIVACY AS A STANDARD FOR
DEFINING FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES

To simply adopt a definition of search that focuses on government
conduct, however, is not enough. Some standard must be articulated for
determining which particular forms of government conduct constitute a
search. This part will argue that social norms of privacy should serve as a
standard for defining fourth amendment searches. That is, conduct by the
government that violates a social norm of privacy should be deemed a
search and be subject, therefore, to judicial oversight under the fourth
amendment. Conversely, conduct by the government that does not violate a
social norm of privacy should not be deemed a search and should be subject
to judicial control only through legislation or other, more general, provisions of the Constitution. 91
A.

Social Norms of Privacy

In society, there is a tension between the desire for freedom and the
desire for privacy. Although few people would wish to live in complete
isolation from the rest of the world, everyone would like to control the
extent of his or her privacy. But this desire cannot be fulfilled within
society. A person who walks down a public street cannot expect others to
avert their eyes. Such an expectation would be an unacceptable limitation
on the freedom of other individuals, and social intercourse would be
requirement, where the burden of requiring those rigid standards would not seem to be justified by a
minimal infringement of fourth amendment interests).
91. The applicability of other constitutional provisions is discussed in Amsterdam, supra note 3, at
377-78.
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impossible. Therefore, society has evolved a set of necessary compromises
that define the limits of individual freedom and privacy.
These necessary compromises, or social norms, define and protect the
individual's right to privacy by establishing standards of conduct for other
members of society. 92 Thus, there are certain areas within which it is
unacceptable to intrude, such as houses, automobiles, and even occupied
telephone booths. But privacy norms are not simply a catalogue of forbidden places. Eavesdropping on a conversation is forbidden, as is opening
other people's mail. The conduct in each instance is forbidden because it
violates socially accepted norms of behavior designed to protect individual
privacy.
Social norms of privacy are not a detailed and idealized code of etiquette.
Of necessity, norms of privacy must be general principles to which nearly
all members of society subscribe. To the extent that some members of
society do not subscribe to a particular norm, that norm will be ineffective
for protecting privacy. Moreover, the application of these general principles to specific situations must be straightforward and uncontroversial.
Otherwise, such principles, again, would be useless for protecting privacy.
Norms with such characteristics are only possible through the common
socialization of members of society. Thus, even young children know the
basic privacy rules of society: that it is "wrong" to enter certain places
without permission, to open other people's mail, to eavesdrop on conversations, and to peek into windows.
B.

Fourth Amendment PrivacyInterests

The fourth amendment does not grant individuals a general right to
privacy. Rather, it protects privacy against certain forms of governmental
intrusion. 93 The language and history of the amendment, however, provide
little guidance for defining the extent of this protection. 94 The Supreme
92. Statutory and common law privacy norms naturally mirror social norms of privacy to a great
extent (e.g., laws against trespassing, tapping telephones, and tampering with the mails), but do not do
so perfectly (e.g., nonelectronic eavesdropping). Moreover, constitutional protections should not be
contingent on legislative enactments. Therefore, legal norms should not be substituted for social norms
in an effort to define fourth amendment searches more explicitly.
93. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967). The legal protection of general privacy
rights must come from Congress or the states. Id.
94. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1745 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 395-401. But see Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1740. In Oliver, the Court, for the
first time since Katz, purported to define the scope of the fourth amendment by its literal language.
Although the Court went on to use a Katz "expectation of privacy" analysis to buttress its conclusion
that an "open field" was not a "person, house, paper, or effect," Justice White was satisfied that the
literal language of the amendment was dispositive. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1744 (White, J., concurring).
The very premise of Katz, however, was that the language of the fourth amendment was not only
unhelpful for defining the scope ofthe amendment, but misleading. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
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Court has therefore sought guidance from legislative enactments and social
conceptions of privacy. In Rakas v. Illinois,95 the Court stated: "Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by
society."' 96 And, in Katz, the Court implicitly linked the fourth amendment's protection of privacy to the protection afforded individual privacy
by society: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, . . . is not a
subject .of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected. ",97
The purpose of the fourth amendment, then, is not to protect privacy per
se, but to protect against governmental encroachment on socially defined
privacy rights. Government conduct that violates a social norm of privacy
98
should be considered a search.
One argument against a social norms of privacy standard is that such a
standard is too vague. Under a social norms of privacy standard, however,
the Court would be guided by generally accepted principles of social
behavior. 99 Social norms of privacy, because they must of necessity be
understood and acted upon by all members of society, 100 are relatively well
defined and easily applied. 101 A social norms of privacy standard would
produce more certain results than the Court's reasonable expectation of
privacy standard.
For example, contrary to the Court's conclusion that an expectation of
privacy in "open fields" is unreasonable, 102 most individuals would probably assume that they had a right to expect that information contained in
347, 351 (1967).
95. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
96. Id. at 143 n.12.
97. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351-52 (1967) (emphasis added). See also United States
v. Williams, 328 F2d 887 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 850 (1964) (no fourth amendment violation
for law enforcement officers to enter premises that are held open for the conduct of public business).
98. Although the Court has recognized that the scope of the fourth amendment should be defined
by "social understandings" concerning privacy, see supra note 96 and accompanying text, the Court
has never satisfactorily defined "social understandings." The Court has used a variety of purported
social understandings to rationalize the decisions that it has reached in particular cases. For example,
the Court has used property laws, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978); business practices,
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979); and Congressional enactments, United States v.

Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1662 (1984). Most importantly, the Court has not used these "understandings" to evaluate the behavior of government agents, but has used them to evaluate the reasonableness
or legitimacy of expectations of privacy in information uncovered by the government.
99. See Part III, infra, for illustrative applications of this approach.
100. See supra PartHA.
101. See infra PartllI.
102. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741 (1984).
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secluded fields, clearly marked as private, would remain private.103 But
whatever conclusion is drawn about the reasonableness of expectations that
information contained in open fields would remain private, there is no
doubt that trespassing onto clearly marked private property is socially
unacceptable. 104 If the Court were to define fourth amendment searches by
reference to social norms of privacy, such a trespass would easily be
identified as a search.
Of course, in seeking to define the scope of the fourth amendment, there
will always be difficult cases, even for a social norms of privacy standard. 105 Nevertheless, such a standard provides a more certain definition of
fourth amendment searches because it is based on existing rules of social
behavior, rather than on an unprincipled evaluation of the reasonableness or
legitimacy of an expectation that a particular piece of information would
have remained undiscovered.
A second argument against a social norms of privacy standard is that,
because the government has a greater legitimate interest in violating
individual privacy than do private parties, fourth amendment privacy rights
should not be linked to social privacy rights. The government's functions,
in particular the police function, require the government to pry into private
affairs. The government's justification for doing so is greater than that of
individuals; therefore, it should not be held to the standards of individuals.
Linking the definition of a search to social norms of privacy, however,
requires only that the government justify those actions that violate social
norms of privacy; linkage does not prohibit those actions per se. To the
extent that the government does have a greater justification for violating
individual privacy than do private individuals, the government will be able
to undertake the violation. The government's action will be a search, but, if
justified, the action will be a "reasonable" search permitted by the fourth
amendment. On the other hand, if the government does not have sufficient
justification, then the fourth amendment should prohibit the government's
06
invasion of privacy. 1
103. Three members of the Court thought so. See Oliver v. United States, 104S. Ct. 1735, 1747-50
(1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens).
104. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
105. For example, from the standpoint of privacy, there is little that is objectionable about aircraft
flying at normal altitudes over private property. A helicopter hovering ten feet above a backyard,
however, would be a different matter. Still, there is no readily apparent altitude at which privacy norms
are violated. The Court must simply be guided by its own understanding of what height would be
socially unacceptable. What is clear, though, is that there is a minimum socially acceptable altitude.
106. Although a justification may exist, the government may not be able to demonstrate the
justification adequately, especially as against a particular individual. (For example, the government
may have information that a suitcase on a particular aircraft contains contraband, but the government
may not know which suitcase.) But justification need not meet a rigid standard, and as Terry v. Ohio
indicates, the justification required by the Court is flexible. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27 (1968). As
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Nor can it be argued that since the impact of government violations of
individual privacy is greater than that of individual violations, the government should be held to a higher standard than private individuals. The class
of practices defined as a search would be quite broad under a social norms
of privacy standard-far broader than the class defined as searches under
the Burger Court. 10 7 Thus, the government would be held to a higher
standard than it now is. Moreover, placing constitutional restraints on
government conduct is pointless in circumstances where anyone could
engage in the same conduct without any social opprobrium. 108 Perhaps
most importantly, no readily apparent definition of a search emerges to
delineate the higher standard to which the government is to be held. The
argument requires the Court to make a value judgment that a certain
government practice infringes too greatly on privacy interests to escape
judicial scrutiny under the fourth amendment. 109 Given the shifting political constitution of the Court, such a standard provides little protection for
individual privacy interests.

the government interest at stake increases, and the invasion of privacy diminishes, the justification
required of the government should decrease. The important point is that some justification is required.
Defining an action as a search gives the courts the power to oversee the use of a particular government
practice; the courts are not required to prohibit the practice or set unreasonable standards for the use of
the practice. The balancing of individual privacy interests with governmental interests should be a part
of the determination of whether a search is reasonable, not a part of the determination of whether the
government's conduct constituted a search at all.
107. See infra Part lII.
108. Part of the difficulty with this second argument is that it confuses to some extent the
distinction between privacy and secrecy. The fourth amendment guarantees the right of the people to be
free from certain acts, viz., unreasonable searches and seizures. The amendment does not, as such,
guarantee that certain information will remain secret. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350
(1967). Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1967) (abandoning the "mere evidence" rule of
limitation on the scope of searches and seizures). For example, in an area that is deserted, but open to
the public, a person's activities are more secret than in an area where there are large numbers ofpeople.
This does not mean that that person's right to privacy is any greater in the deserted area. If the deserted
area were to be suddenly inundated with people, that person could not complain of a loss of privacy
rights, only of a loss of secrecy. Government actions that do not violate privacy norms may be
analogized to the inundation of a secluded area by large numbers of people-the impact on secrecy is
substantial, but privacy rights are not diminished. A government action cannot be a search under the
fourth amendment simply because that action has a substantial impact on secrecy. If that were true,
government would have to justify almost every act designed to gather information. The better approach
to the definition of a search is to look only to those privacy expectations that individuals possess by
virtue of social norms of privacy, and to require the government either to conform to those expectations
or to provide justification for violations of those expectations. Whether government acts are searches
should depend on what the government does, not onwhat it is likely to discover.
109. Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 403.
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APPLYING THE SOCIAL NORMS OF PRIVACY STANDARD

A.

Identifying Social Norms of Privacy

Under a social norms of privacy standard, a court must determine
whether the government's conduct would be socially unacceptable if engaged in by a private individual. Where the conduct is of the sort that is
occasionally engaged in by private parties, this determination is relatively
straightforward because everyone, including judges, has been socialized
against such conduct if it violates a social norm of privacy. Everyone knows
not to enter other people's houses without permission, open their mail,
eavesdrop on their conversations, or go through their belongings.
More difficult are circumstances in which the conduct of the government
involves the use of a novel technique or a practice in which private parties
almost never engage. Because private individuals do not engage in these
practices, they will not have been socialized against them. Examples of
these practices are the use of drug-detecting dogs, electronic tracking
devices, and spy satellites. Such practices, however, can be evaluated under
the fourth amendment through analogies to practices for which there are
relevant social norms of privacy. For instance, drug-detecting dogs are used
to investigate private containers for the presence of contraband. Such an
investigation if undertaken by a human would violate a social norm of
privacy against prying into closed containers of others. Therefore, the use
of drug-detecting dogs should constitute a search.
B.

Illustrative Applications of the Social Norms of Privacy Standard

The cases in which the post-Katz Court has had the most difficulty
determining the proper scope of the fourth amendment can be divided into
four broad categories: (1) questions of standing to assert fourth amendment
rights; (2) government requests for personal and financial records from
third parties; (3) physical entries onto or into various locations and things;
and (4) the use of sophisticated sensing and surveillance devices. This part
will use these categories to illustrate the application of a social norms of
privacy standard.
1.

Standing

Under the fourth amendment, standing is treated as a substantive issue.
To have standing, a person must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information uncovered by the government. 1 0 Generally, before finding
110.

See supra note 40.
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such an expectation, the Court has required a very strong possessory
interest in the location in which the information was uncovered. 11' Because
a person's expectation of privacy in information located in an area controlled by another is deemed to be unreasonable, the government's conduct in
exposing such information cannot be a search as to a person who does not
have a possessory interest, even though the conduct is a search as to a
person who does have a possessory interest.
Under the social norms of privacy standard urged in this Comment,
standing would not be contingent on possessory interests. Rather, standing
would follow when an injury results from the government's violation of a
social norm of privacy. Individuals act in reliance on social norms of
privacy; they should be able to rely on their expectations that the police will
not forcibly enter their friends' homes, just as they rely on their expectations that the police will not forcibly enter their own homes.
2.

Requestsfor Personaland FinancialRecordsfrom Third Parties

The Court has held that individuals have no legitimate expectation of
privacy in personal and financial records held by third parties. 112 The
Court's rationale is that there can be no expectation of privacy in informa13
tion voluntarily conveyed to another.
Under the social norms of privacy standard, the question is whether the
government's conduct violated a social norm of privacy. For example, if the
government broke into a bank's offices to obtain a customer's financial
records, such conduct would obviously violate a social norm of privacy,
and would therefore be a search as to both the bank and the customer. Under
the Court's standing doctrine, such conduct would be a search only as to the
bank.

114

A somewhat different situation is presented by the bank's disclosure of
financial records at the request of the government. Ordinarily, a request for
information made to an independent party capable of refusing the request
violates no privacy norm. For the request to succeed, the cooperation of the
requestee is required, and the requestee has presumably obtained the
requested information through the voluntary and knowing disclosure of the
person about whom the information is sought. The unauthorized disclosure
of information by the requestee may amount to a betrayal of trust, but
11I. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
112. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-46 (1979) (dicta) (telephone billing records);
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (banking records).
113. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,744 (1979) (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 443 (1976)).
114. See supra Part IIIB.1.
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neither the betrayer nor the government actor who requested the information would have obtained the information by violating a norm of privacy.
Moreover, the fourth amendment does not govern the private actions of the
requestee unless those actions are so intertwined with the government as to
115
amount to a government action.
This last caveat suggests, however, that disclosures of personal information by banks and other heavily regulated industries should be considered a
fourth amendment search. Moreover, even if a bank is not sufficiently
intertwined with the government to make the bank an agent of the government, the degree of government regulation precludes the conclusion that
the bank is making a voluntary disclosure of the information.
3.

Physical Entries

In United States v. Oliver,116 the Court upheld the pre-Katz "open fields"
doctrine of Hester v. UnitedStates. 117 According to this doctrine, the fourth
amendment does not apply to government entries onto "open fields," i.e.,
those areas not a part of a building or the curtilage of a home, even though
the fields may be private property. " 8 The bases of the Court's decision were
that "open fields" are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a
home, office, or commercial structure would not be, and that the activities
that take place in "open fields" are not sufficiently deserving of fourth
amendment protection. "19
Oliver would have been decided differently under a social norms of
privacy standard. Under this standard, the accessibility of open fields is
irrelevant to whether a social norm of privacy prohibits entry onto such
fields. The deliberate entry onto the clearly identified private property
described in Oliver violated a norm of privacy. Such an entry should have
been considered a fourth amendment search. 120
More generally, any encroachment onto areas that are defined as private
by social norms should be a search, 121 regardless of whether a possessory
interest in such an area is recognized in the law of property. To this extent,
115.

See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).

116.
117.
118.

104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
265 U.S. 57 (1924).
Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1743-44 (1984).

119. See supra note 87.
120. In some instances, there is an implicit invitation for strangers to enter private property for
limited purposes. This is true of the public portions of stores, offices, and, absent an indication to the
contrary, sidewalks leading to the front doors of homes. Such entries, if conducted within socially
accepted limits, would not violate any privacy norms and should not be considered searches.

121. Such an interest need not be a legal interest. For example, a person does not have a legal
interest in occupying a clothing store changing room, but social norms of privacy dictate that others
may not enter while the changing room is occupied.

Defining a Fourth Amendment Search
the social norms of privacy standard is consistent with Katz. Both the
majority opinion and Justice Harlan's concurrence identified a telephone
booth as a temporarily private place once a person has occupied it for the
purpose of making a call, 122 thereby manifesting a socially recognized
interest in the privacy of the booth. Similarly, department store changing
rooms, restaurant booths, and a variety of other places would be considered
"private places," even though easily accessible to the public.
4.

Use of SophisticatedSensing and Surveillance Devices

Under the Court's current standard, whether the use of sensing and
surveillance devices is a search turns on whether a person has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the information uncovered by the devices. A
social norms of privacy standard, on the other hand, requires courts to
assess whether the use itself of a particular sensing or surveillance device
violates a social norm of privacy. The required assessment is best analyzed
by looking at two broad classes of these devices: those that operate
surreptitiously and those that operate openly.
Devices that operate surreptitiously violate social norms of privacy. The
surreptitious use of sensing and surveillance devices is akin to eavesdropping. In our society it is generally unacceptable to observe or listen to other
persons when those persons believe that they are unseen and unobserved
and have no reasonable means of discovering that they are being moni23
tored. 1
The open use of sensing and surveillance devices in places where a
human observer could not legitimately be present clearly violates a social
norm of privacy. 124 A more difficult question is the open following of an
individual in public or the posting of television cameras on public streets.
Certainly, no norm of privacy is violated when an individual observes
another from a public place. In a certain sense, a video camera in a public
122. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967); id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
123. If a person is engaged in an activity other than eavesdropping, social norms of privacy
probably do not require that person to inform others that they are being observed or to refrain from
observation. Those persons observed could probably have reasonably ascertained the presence of others
or the risk that others could observe them. For example, if one is in a secluded area of a park and
observes others who believe that they are unobserved, no norm of privacy is violated by observing
without betraying one's presence. A police officer who observes a drug transaction under such
circumstances would not be engaging in a search. Quite another matter, however, is hiding in a bush or
placing hidden microphones with the intention of spying on others. The difference is that persons who
wish to preserve their privacy can take reasonable steps to do so if they need only expect the presence of
others engaged in "normal" activities. To check every bush and every inch of ground for hidden
observers and microphones is unreasonable. People should be able to rely upon norms against
eavesdropping in these situations.
124. See United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3303-04 (1984).
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place does nothing more than would an individual in a similar location. But
a video camera also permits an observer to stare without being seen, 125 and
26
a plethora of video cameras may be the equivalent of following a person. 1
Intentionally following a person does violate a privacy norm. 2 7 Therefore,
just as the open following of individuals by the police should require some
justification under the fourth amendment, 12 8 the extensive use of video
cameras, even in the open, should require a similar justification.
CONCLUSION
The Burger Court has progressively narrowed the scope of the fourth
amendment's protection of individual privacy. That Court has done so by
defining a fourth amendment search by reference to the secrecy and
legitimacy of information uncovered by the government. Such a definition
is unrelated to individual privacy expectations. This Comment has proposed that fourth amendment searches be defined as government conduct
that violates a social norm of privacy. This proposal would not only more
completely protect privacy interests, but would also provide the Court with
more guidance in defining the scope of the fourth amendment.
Michael Campbell

125. There is probably a norm against taking other people's photographs in public without
permission, but this norm may not be sufficiently universal to elevate a similar police practice to the
status of a search.
126. Video cameras also enable the viewer to observe an object or person from more than one
angle.
127. Temporarily following someone by happening to travel the same route is not objectionable,
but deliberate, long term following is objectionable.
128. But cf. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-84 (1983).
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